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ETHICAL, MORAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
BARRIERS TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES EMPLOYED BY GAY MEN AND
LESBIAN WOMEN
Catherine DeLair*
INTRODUCTION
Gay Rights groups estimate that there are approximately four million
gay men and lesbian women raising between eight and ten million
children. These figures primarily represent children born out of
previously heterosexual relationships, not those born in households
with two women or two men.2  However, facilitated by a host of
assisted reproductive technologies, there are ever increasing numbers of
gay men and lesbian women, as individuals, or in couples, who are
choosing to bear and raise biologically related children. The 1980's
saw an increase in the number of children born to lesbians.4 In the
1990's, these numbers extended to gay men.5 The media has coined
*B.S.N., University of Wisconsin, 1991; J.D. with Health Law Certificate, DaPaul
University College of Law, 2000.
'See Sue A. Pressley & Nancy Andrews, For Gay Couples, It Nursery Becomes the
New Frontier, WASH. PosT, Dec. 20, 1992, at A22 (basing the figures on the aszumption that
ten percent of the population is homosexual); see also Charlotte J. Patter-on, Chldren of
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD. DEv. 1025, 1026 (1992) (noting "Estimates of the number
of lesbian mothers generally run about 1-5 million and those for gay father=3 from I to 3
million").
2See Pressley & Andrews, supra note 1, at A22.3Precise data regarding the numbers of children being born and raifcd in homose'xual
households is not available.
4See Jean L. Griffen, The Gay Baby Boom, CHic. TIM., Sept. 3, 1992, at 5.
"See id.
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the phenomenon a "gay baby boom," "lesbian baby boom," and the
"gay-by boom." 6
Gays' and lesbians' motivations for wanting to bear and raise a
biological child are similar to those of heterosexual couples. Many
intend to have children in order to form a family unit.7 Some see
having a child with a partner as a "common project" and a way of
demonstrating love and commitment. 8  Some may desire to fulfill a
biological drive and to even experience pregnancy. Finally, the desire
to have a child may be rooted in cultural and sociological expectations. 9
Because they do not engage in heterosexual relationships, gays
and lesbians must turn to assisted reproductive technologies in order to
produce genetically related children. While there are many kinds of
assisted reproductive technologies, it is beyond the scope of this paper
to discuss all of them.10 I will therefore, focus on the two forms of
assisted reproductive technologies most commonly utilized by lesbians
and gay men--artificial insemination and surrogacy." i Despite available
technology and increasing numbers of homosexuals who desire to have
genetically related children, gays and lesbians still face significant
barriers to assisted reproductive technology. This paper will examine
those barriers and offer possible solutions. In addition, the social,
moral and ethical barriers to reproductive technologies will be
examined. These barriers include moral and religious convictions
against reproductive technologies and moral and personal convictions
against homosexuality. Monetary and legal barriers will also be
examined. This paper also offers different challenges to these barriers.
6See id. Pressley & Andrews, supra note 1, at A22; Lisa C. Ikemeto, The In!Fertile, the
Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1055 (1996).
7See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation of the Married, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 669, 679 (1985).
8See Y. Engelert, Artificial Insemination of Single Women with Donor Semen, 9 HUM.
REPROD. 1969 (1994).
9See Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single
Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173,
183 (1996) (noting that children are a "badge of honor," and that parenting provides a way to
pass on one's attitudes beliefs and values).
t0For a discussions of other forms of reproductive technologies, see LORI B. ANDREWS,
NEW CONCEPTIONS: A GUIDE To THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS (1984).
"Surrogacy is the only form of assisted reproductive technology available to men.
Assuming that lesbians are otherwise healthy and fertile, artificial insemination is the form of
assisted reproductive technology most commonly used because it is the easiest, safest and
cheapest. See JANE MATrES, SINGLE MOTHERS By CHOICE 26-36 (1994).
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BACKROUND
Because of their biological ability to bear children, lesbians have been
able to have children, often without medical insemination, through the
process of artificial insemination. 12  Artificial insemination is the
"introduction of semen in a women's vagina or uterus, other than by
sexual intercourse." 13  Artificial insemination is a relatively safe,
simple and cost effective procedure. 14 Semen can be obtained via a
known donor, or it can be purchased from a sperm bank.15 Women
have the choice of being inseminated at a sperm bank, a physician's
office, or in the privacy of their own home.'
6
Because men cannot biologically bear a child, the only way a gay
man can have a genetic child by involving a "surrogate mother."' 7 A
surrogate mother is "one who bears a child for a person or a couple
unable to have children." s  There are two varieties of surrogacy:
traditional and gestational.19 A traditional surrogate mother provides
both the female gestational and genetic components of reproduction.2
0
She is typically artificially inseminated with the sperm of the intended
biological father.2' In contrast, a gestational surrogate mother is one
who provides only the gestational component of reproduction.- Gay
men are likely to choose traditional surrogacy because gestational
surrogates must undergo In Vitro fertilization (IVF), a costly procedure
12See Maria J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Famthes T/trozuh Strra.Gqy
Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 At,.i U. I. GENDER SOC. POL'V & L,
183, 190 (1995).
13U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: ARIFICIAL ltES.21TIJN
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SUR\vYi-BAC4-UU,,N-ji),D P:zr, 7
(1988) [hereinafter OTA SURVEY].
4See MATrES, supra note 11, at 26-36.
5See id.
16See id. Artificial insemination can be accomplished by simply using a jrInge or "the
legendary turkey baster." See APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PAt,tr-m H',au n:i
48 (1993). For a website listing various sperm banks see Donor Resources at
http:/lwww.fertilityplus.orgfaq/donor.html (last visited May 21, 1999).
17Hollandsworth, supra note 12, at 199.
18BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (1996).
19See Ethics Commission of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Const,,rattons of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY IS. 67S (Supp Nov, 1994)
[hereinafter Ethics Commission].
20See id.2tSee idat7lS.
2'See id. at 67S.
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that increases the medical risk to the surrogate. 23  Both forms of
surrogacy are ordinarily agreed to via written contract, with the
intention that the surrogate relinquishes all parental rights, giving the
biological father full custody.24
SOCIAL, MORAL AND ETHICAL BARRIERS
The most common and the most significant barrier that gays and
lesbians face when trying to access reproductive technologies is
physician discrimination and refusal to provide treatment. 25 Physicians
mediate all access to medical care, and they are, in a sense,
"gatekeepers" deciding who receives treatment. 26 The physician/patient
relationship is considered a contractual one.27  The physician/patient
relationship has traditionally been voluntary and personal, in which, for
a variety of reasons, the physician may choose whether to enter.28
Absent an established patient/physician relationship, physicians are
under no duty to treat a patient. 29 Thus, physicians, especially those in
private practice, wield a considerable amount of power regarding who
is granted access to certain treatments. All physicians require some
form of screening process prior to providing services for artificial
insemination. 30 The screening process typically includes one or more
23In Vitro Fertilization is a procedure whereby an oocyte and sperm are fertilized and
transferred surgically or laproscopically into the surrogate. The benefit of using a gestational
surrogate is that the biological father's semen can be fertilized with an egg from a member his
partner's family, thereby creating a child that is genetically related to both partners.24Ethics Commission, supra note 19, at 67S.
25See infra notes 26-60 and accompanying text.26Patients typically seek out physicians for diagnosis and treatment of disease states,
Based on the initial history and physical, physicians decide whether the patient will require
medical follow-up and access to care.
27See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 284
(2d ed. 1991).28See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 428
(3d ed. 1997); see also American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Principles of Medical Ethics, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH
ANNOTATIONS (1996) ("A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in
which they provide medical services."). Under Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), physicians are statutorily mandated to at least screen, and if warranted.
provide treatment in situations of emergencies and active labor. See 42 U.S.C. 1395dd.
29See FURRoW, supra note 28, at 428.
3°See OTA SURVEY, supra note 13, at 9.
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of the following: a fertility history, a personal medical history, a
physical examination, a family history, and a personality assessment.
31
A physician uses the information from the initial evaluation to
determine whom he or she will treat. 32 Only four out of five patients
will be accepted for treatment.
33
Discrimination against gays and lesbians remains pervasive in
society.34  Physicians may choose to deny treatment to homosexuals.
Physicians who discriminate against gays' and lesbians' access to
assisted reproductive technologies will do so for a variety of reasons.
These reasons can be categorized as (A) moral and/or ethical objections
to reproductive technologies, (B) religious objections to reproductive
technologies or homosexuality, and (C) personal prejudices against
homosexuality.35
Moral and Ethical Objections
to Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Physicians may refuse to provide services based on moral and/or
ethical objections to assisted reproductive technologies in general."
Additionally, even if a physician is willing to provide services for some
assisted reproductive technologies, he or she may have objections
specific to surrogacy.
37
Ethical objections to reproductive technologies are multifaceted.
Some believe that reproductive technology is irresponsible because our
3 See id. Between June and August of 1987, physicians likely to conduct artificial
insemination-services-internal medicine, family practice. gy necolog., obtetrics urology, etc.-
were surveyed regarding the different aspects of their artificial insemination practice, 15,552
questionnaires were completed and returned (61% response rate). See id32See id.33See id. Reasons for excluding patients were often not medically related and included:
she is unmarried (52%), psychologically immature (22%), homoze.ual (15%) and V;elfarc-
dependent (15%). See id.34A Newsweek poll noted that 73% of the polling public believed that homouef:uals %%ere
victims of some discrimination. See David A. Kaplan & Daniel Klaidmen. A Battle, Vot th,2
War, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996, at 24.35See Lesbian Friendly Doctors and Sperm Bans. aralable at
http://www.lesbian.org/momsdrs-sb.htm (the author encourages readers to add and uplate to
the listing).36See generally OTA SURVEY, supra note 13, at 9 (noting that 15% of rezpjnding
physicians indicated that they exclude women from access to artificial incmination for being
homosexual).37See Ethics Commission, supra note 19, at 67S-69S (noting general sacictal rc er ,ations
regarding surrogacy).
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society is already overpopulated. 38  Others argue that assisted
reproduction is "unnatural." 9  One theologian has stated that "the
further the act of insemination, for instance, from the personal union
and common life of the donor and recipient of the seed, the further
from the human and therefore the more suspect morally the practice
would be.",40 Finally, others argue that assisted reproduction could lead
to drastic, unacceptable changes in society. Because assisted
reproductive technologies allow the parents to choose the egg and or
sperm donor, they may be tempted to create "superkids" by choosing as
a donor, only those with specific talents or traits.42
Even physicians who accept conventional assisted reproductive
technologies might object to surrogacy. The issues of surrogacy are
politically charged, especially among feminists, and raises additional
objections because it involves a third party.4 3 Reservations about
surrogacy can be categorized in one of three ways. First, there are
concerns surrounding the potential psychological effects on the
surrogate, the child, and the intended couple.44  Second, some argue
that surrogacy exploits women.45 Finally, some argue that children are
commodified in surrogacy arrangements. 46
Studies have shown that some surrogates will experience a period
of mourning and grief after relinquishing the child. 7 This may be
38See ANDREIWS, supra note 10, at 12.
39See id.40See id. quoting G.R. Dunsteen.41See id. at 13.42See id.43See generally Ethics Commission, supra note 19, at 73S-74S (discussing the political
and moral objections to surrogacy).
44See id. at 73S.45See Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 Wis. WOMAN'S L.J. 113, 160 (1997);
Norma J. Wikler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist
Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. REV. 1043, 1044 (1986).46See Ethics Commission, supra note 19, at IS, 74S.47See id. But see, Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Symposium on Biomedical
Technology and Health Care: Social and Conceptual Transformations: Technical Article:
Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. REV. 623, 678 (1991). Studies have shown that 22% of
surrogates state that giving up the child was the most emotionally challenging aspect of the
arrangement, but 25% said losing contact with the intended parents was the most difficult
aspect. The same study found that 75% of the women agreed that the most rewarding aspect of
the arrangement was seeing the couples' happiness, giving the gift of life, etc. See id at 676
citing Kathy Forest and David MacPhee, Surrogate Mothers' Grief Experiences and Social
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inherent in the biological and emotional bond formed after nine months
of carrying a child and giving birth.48 If the surrogate remains
anonymous, the child may subsequently suffer psychological harm by
trying to learn the biological mother's identity.4 ) It is unclear if a
child's psychological development is affected if the surrogate is a
relative or close friend of the intended couple.: However, if the
surrogate is a close friend or relative to the intended parentls), the
surrogate's continued involvement may cause tension in the intended
parent(s) household. 51  Furthermore, the intended parent(s) may be
psychologically stressed if the surrogate mother attempts to establish
custodial or visitation rights. 2
Physicians, particularly those who are feminist, may refuse to
provide assistance and care in surrogacy arrangements because of
political and/or philosophical beliefs.5 3 Some feminists view surrogacy
as highly exploitative of women.54 Opponents argue that, because a fee
is paid to surrogates, those most likely to offer their reproductive
capabilities will be poor women in financial need. 5  Thus, wealthier
couples will take advantage of females in lower classes in order to meet
their own reproductive means, 56thereby creating a class of reproductive
"breeders." 57 Interestingly however, some research suggests that the
Support Networks (1989) (unpublished manuscript available at the Deprtiznt of H.imn
Development and Family Studies, Colorado State University).4 5See Ethics Commission, supra note 19, at 73S.
'
9See id. at 74S.
50See id.
5 Id. at 73S.52See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 47, at 674 citing Hillary Hanafin, Stra ,,tc
Parenting: Reassessing Human Bonding (August 28, 1937) (unpublished pap-er pre;ented at
A.P.A. Convention, New York), "Recent studies on the outcomes of surrogac. arrangement
show that all but a few cases of surrogate arrangements go smoothly, v. ill all parics satiied
with their involvement."
3See generally Wikler, supra note 45 (discussing feminist pespeetives regarding
surrogacy); Katherine E. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist ritique ofSurrqat'ae b2
Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205 (1992) (discussing feminist perspectives regarding surrogac I
"See id. Radical feminists argue that surrogacy is akin to prostitution .Se IKeran.
supra note 45, at 160, citing Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Pcrspcctiv,,s ad Gest.ltdu nl
Motherhood: The Search for a Unified Legal Focus, in REPRODUcI'Om ETics AD TIle L 'w
55, 68 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995). In both situations, the women must sell a " rvtce" in
prostitution it is a sexual service, in surrogacy it is their reproductive service), p e t/
S5ee Kerian, supra note 45, at 163 (1997), citingTong, supra note 54. at (i4-65.
'
561d.
See Linda J. Lacy, "0 Wind, Remind Him that I Have No Child" Infertility and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & LAw, 163, 194 (1993), Cetmq Gena Corea, Th
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economic gap between intended parent(s) and surrogate mother is not
that great.5 8  Moreover, opponents argue that surrogacy equates with
"baby-selling" because children are contracted for and a surrogate
mother relinquishes rights to her biological child in exchange for
monetary compensation. 59 The children born out of such arrangements
simply become "goods in a marketplace that demands product
quality.
60
Religious Objections to
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Homosexuality
Physicians may refuse to provide assisted reproductive technologies in
general, or to gays and lesbians specifically, because of religious
objections. Religious objections to homosexuality are presumably
fueled by negative references to homosexuality in the Bible,61as well as
in religious teachings.62 The Catholic religion teaches that procreation
should only occur in the sanctity of a marriage between a man and a
woman. 63  Thus, any form of artificial reproductive manipulation is
considered morally wrong.64 Catholics condemn artificial insemination
as "immoral purely and simply." 65  Masturbation, the most common
method for obtaining semen, is also condemned.66 Moreover, it is
Mother Machine: Reproductive Technology From Artificial Insemination to Artificial 11Wombs,
in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 276 (Helen Bequaert, ed., 1992)),
58See Marjorie Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 389, n,309 (One study showed the
average income of the intended parents to be $55,000 and the surrogate mother's family income
$32,000).
59See Kerian, supra note 45, at 153, 165.
601d. at 165.61See Genesis 19:1-11 (telling the story of Sodom); Leviticus 20:13 (identifying
homosexuality as an abomination); Romans 1:18-32 (identifying homosexuality as a crime and
a sin against nature); and I Corinthians 6:9 (identifying homosexuality is incompatible with
entry into the kingdom of God).62See Kevin D. O'Rourke & Phillip Boyle, MEDICAL ETHICS: SOURCES OF CATHOLIC
TEACHINGS 140-43 (1993).63See id. at 54. Catholics believe that "life should be sustained only in a natural manner,
and any deviation from the natural process of fertilization and gestation is a violation of this
theological principle." This is known as natural law. See Rabbi David M. Feldman, The
Ethical Implications of New Reproductive Techniques, in JEWISH VALUES IN BIOETHICs 174
(Rabbi Levi Meier ed., 1986).
64See O'RoURKE & BOYLE, supra note 62, at 54.6 5Id. at 57 (quoting Pope John Pious XlI's speech to the Fourth International Congress of
Doctors in Rome on Sept. 29, 1949).66See id. at 55-56.
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immoral for a woman to receive semen from someone other than her
husband.67 To do so represents adultery on the part of the wife and
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the child.63 Catholics view surrogate
motherhood as wrong on two grounds. First, it violates the spiritual
and biological union of marriage and parental relationship."' Second, it
exploits women as "baby makers" and children as commodities.
70
The Jewish faith is more willing to accept some forms of assisted
reproduction. 71  Jewish leaders cite to three principles which, with
certain restrictions, permit the use of some "fertility increasing
manipulation" (.e.In-vitrol fertilization): (1) the commandment "be
fruitful and multiply;" (2) the commandment of charity, in this case,
using ones possessions or talents to ease the suffering of another (a
childless couple); and (3) the principle of domestic peace and family
integrity. 72 Despite these principles, many Jewish authorities argue that
artificial insemination from a donor is forbidden. 73 Some view vomen
who conceive by artificial insemination as adulterous and the children
as illegitimate.74 There is also the concern about the possibility of
incest when using anonymous donors because a woman may
unknowingly use a relative's donated sperm.7- Artificial insemination
of either a lesbian woman or a surrogate mother is also unethical under
a Jewish belief system because masturbation is viewed as immoral.
76
Orthodox Jews believe it sinful to "waste the seed. Many Jewish
leaders disagree with surrogacy altogether because of surrogacy's
67See id. at 55.6SSee id. at 54-55.
69See O'RoURKE & BOYLE, supra note 62, at 323.70See id.
7 tSee generally SECOND INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON M ,[IACE, EHICS AN D
JEWISH LAW: TAmuZ 5756-JuLY 1996: COLLECTION OF EsSAYS 27 (Mordechai Halperin at al,
eds., 1996); JEWISH VALUES IN BIOEtHIcs 174 (Rabbi Levi Meier ed... 192o) tdiscu:smg the
acceptance of some forms of assisted reproduction).
72See Rabbi M. HaIpperin, Iz-Vitro Fertilization, Insernnation ai:J Et.- nntiun. in
SECOND INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON MEDCINE. ETHICS AND JEWISli L%. v, UAMUZ 575(-
JULY 1996: COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 2S (Mordechai Halperin et al. eds., 1 t)9J
7'See id. at31.
74See id. Rabbi David M. Feldman, The Ethical Ihplicattns o N. Rtra.ltttr,
Techniques, in JEWISH VALUES IN BIOETHICs 181 (Rabbi Levi Meier ed.. 19*01
75See Fred Rosner, In Vitro Fertilization. Surrogate 1fvkhrhUi. andJ SALv (,J,,mn
Transplants, in SECOND INTERNATIONAL COLLOQIUM ON MEDICINE, litIcs Atr) JEW V.151 LAW.
TAmuz 5756-JULY 1996: COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 110 (Mordechai Halperin at al. ad:. 19m),
76See Feldman, supra note 74, at 180.
77WILLFORD J. FEINGOLD, ARTIFIcAL INS MINATION S3 (2d ed. 1976).
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ethical and legal problems (exploitation and maternal identity).
However, some Jewish leaders would find surrogacy permissible only
in the absence of any other alternative "to save a marriage or to bring
happiness to the depressed., 79
Some Protestants take a strict view of artificial insemination
finding that it that the totality of marriage is ruined because artificial
insemination ruins the "one-flesh unity of husband and wife."' ° Other
Protestant leaders would argue that artificial insemination is
acceptable. 81 These leaders see mutual consent between a husband a
wife as a way of warding off accusations of "broken faith., 82
Additionally, they view the act of a sterile husband sanctioning
artificial insemination as a way of strengthening the marriage. 83
Discrimination Based on Personal Prejudices Regarding
Homosexuality or Homosexuals as Parents
Physicians may discriminate and refuse to treat gays and lesbians
because they find homosexuality personally offensive and/or because
they feel that homosexual parenting is not in the best interest of the
child. 84  Many find homosexuality to be personally repugnant.85
Instead of viewing homosexuals as having similar emotions, attitudes,
and values, some view homosexuals as strictly sexual beings, 86 who are
only concerned with sexual gratification. 87
78See Feldman, supra note 74, at 179-81.79Rosner, supra note 75, at 114. Presumably two conditions would apply, one, the
semen is not procured through masturbation (i.e. from a condom or coitus interuptus) and two,
the surrogate is not paid for more than her expenses. See Feldman. supra note 74. at 178, 1SO
(Rabbi Levi Meier ed.).
SGerald T. Perkoff, Artificial Insemination in a Lesbian, a Case Analysis, 145 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 527, 528 (1985).
8
'See id.
8 2See id., citing J. F. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE: THE PROBLENIS OF TIlE
PATIENT'S RIGHTS To KNOW THE TRUTH, CONCEPTION. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION STERILITY
EUTHANASIA, 1954.
"
3See id.
84See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
851 use the word "repugnant" because homosexuality is commonly believed to be
"unnatural."
86See Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Gay and Lesbian Parents
and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 624 (1996) (noting that "many people, including many
judges, perceive lesbians and gay men as exclusively sexual, while heterosexual parents are
perceived as people, who along with many other activities in their lives, occasionally engage in
sex"); "Since at least the nineteenth century, gay men have been known for their promitscuous
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Physicians may also discriminate against gays and lesbians
because they believe the homosexual environment is bad for the
children. 88 Some may find that homosexuality represents a threat to the
concept and values of the "traditional family."" Traditional family
lacks a precise definition, but it is commonly defined as "two
heterosexual, married adults and their biological or adoptive
children." 90  This traditional concept of family has existed for
centuries. 9' Two men or two women having children challenges this
ancient notion of family, and some critics speculate that it sets a bad
example for children reared in this environment.9 2
Because gays and lesbians are not able to legally marry, man),
people harbor false perceptions that homosexuals are involved in short-
term and unstable relationships. 93 Since parental instability is regarded
as dangerous to the psychological development of the children, some
conclude that gays and lesbians malke bad parents because they are
more likely to be involved in unstable relationships.9i However, this
conclusion is without merit since heterosexual relationships, just like
homosexual relationships, can be equally stable or unstable. Several
studies have indicated that gays and lesbians are often involved in long
subcultures." See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Youth, Family and the Lau RL4,/!.s aTni
Establishing Recognition: Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Faad. ozc.i ,itt '2,
5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 117, quoting WILLIAM N. EsiauGE, THE CASE FOR SV ,-N MAtP,'uf
9-10 (1996).
SSee Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parentlqq .n Uafdem
1997 U. ILL. L. REv. S33, 840 (1997).
SSSee id at 85 1.
"'See Radhika Rao. Assisted Reproductive Technolo, and the Threat to tfz2 Tra..twunal
Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951,956, n. 20 (1996).
"3See id.
91See id.
92See generally Wardle, supra note 87 (arguing that children of homos %uals are hkel%
to psychologically and psychosexually harmed).
93See David K. Flaks, Symposium: Defining Family. Gays. Lesbians, and tk Vcaunq of
Family: Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions. Scientific Realitics, 3 WV.i & ,M an'
BILL RTs. J. 345, 351 (1994).
94See id.
"'See id
951d at 353, citing Susan Golombok et al., Clldren in Lshian and S.%?Vk-Patront
Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCitui. & P.YCIt,-I-'i
551, 553 (1983). The study stated, "it seems doubtful \hether transtence is any more
characteristic of lesbian relationships than of women's heterosexual relationships. Se td
Moreover, in today's society, divorce rates may be as high as 52%.
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term relationships, 97and can therefore, provide stability in a home
environment.
There are those who claim that children raised by homosexuals are
likely to be harmed. 93 For example, Professor Wardle, author of The
Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, along with
others, expresses concern that the psychosexual and psychological
development of the children will be negatively affected. 99 Wardle, not
suprisingly, argues for the adoption of a legal presumption that
homosexual parenting is not in the best interest of a child. ' 00
One concern regarding the children's psychosexual
development is that they will not be exposed to dual gender role models
and will, therefore, suffer from gender identity and will fail to develop
appropriate sex-typed behavior. 101 Some question whether boys and
girls will develop interests and participate in activities that are
appropriately masculine and feminine,102or if boys will begin acting
effeminate and girls will begin acting masculine. 103 Another concern is
that children raised in homosexual environments will have a higher
predisposition to be being homosexual themselves. 1
04
There are those who also believe that a homosexual environment
is detrimental to a child's psychological development.'0 5 Assumptions
are made that the child's moral, emotional, behavioral, and intellectual
development will be compromised. 10 6  Specifically, there is fear that
children will be subjected to ridicule; will develop low self-esteem; will
97See id. at 352-53 (discussing and citing several studies).
98See generally Wardle, supra note 87 (discussing how children will be harmed by
homosexuals).
99See Wardle, supra note 87, at 833; Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children
by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 191 (,
198-201 (1995); Harlow, supra note 9, at 98-201 (1996); Flaks, supra note 72. at 345, 355-72.
'
00See Wardle, supra note 87, at 893-94.
""1See Flaks, supra note 93, at 364-68; Harlow, supra note 9, at 199; Patterson, supra
note 99, at 198; Wardle, supra note 87, at 858, 866.
102See Flaks, supra note 93, at 366.
10 3See Patterson, supra note 99, at 198.
1°4See Flaks, supra note 93, at 368-71, 386 (noting that legislators and judges use this
assumption to deny homosexual parents custody or visitation rights); Patterson, supra note 99,
at 198; Wardle, supra note 87, at 852.
'
05See generally Flaks, supra note 93 and Patterson, supra note 99 (discussing the
perceived psychological harm of children exposed to homosexual parents).
106See Flaks, supra note 93, at 355.
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be less socially popular; viii have lower intellectual capabilities; and
will develop behavioral problems. 10
7
However, several recent studies have refuted these claims, ! "and
overall, none of the existing research supports any of the above
concerns. 09 For example, several studies found no difference between
a child raised in a heterosexual home and a child raised in a
homosexual home in terms of a child's gender identity. 110 The studies
also demonstrated that children raised in homosexual families
developed appropriate and traditional sex-typed behaviors l land none
of the children raised by lesbians112or gay men' 13were any more likely
'
07See Patterson, supra note 99, at 197-200; Flaks, supra note 793 at 356-57
103See Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Frathes. 63 CHILDt DZ%
1025 (1992) (analyzing and discussing several studies that look at the intelletual.
psychological, and psychosexual impact of children raised by huomu eualt uttn th e
following studies: Frederick W. Bozett, Ga. Fathers: A Revic'iw oJ t:; Litcrttr,. In
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 137 (Frederick W. Bozett ed.. 1939). Frederick W Bouet.
Children of Gay Fathers, in GAY AND LESBIAN PArxEwTs 39 (Frederick W, Bozett ed,, 197).
Frederick W. Bozett, Heterogeneous Couples in Heterosexual Marraqges Gay ken and
Straight Women, 3 J. MARrrAL& FAm. TERAPY 81 (1982); Frederick %Y. Bozelt, (,w Fatlh:rs
How and Why They Disclose Their Homosaxuality, to Their Children, 29 FAM Ila 173 1930;
Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Househols Psyvhev&?_vua and
Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551 (1933); Jule S. Cioltm-n,
Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY RIATU Au;s 177
(Frederick W. Bozett & Marvin Sussman eds., 1990); Richard Green et al, Losbian MV:z~:r
and their Children: A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Motlwrs And fieir Children.
15 ARCHIVES OF SE&UAL BEtAV. 167 (1986)- Richard Green. Sexual Identtit, of3- CI7IJU-n
Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents. 135 A.1. J. PsYCInlATwY 692 j19 781. Bezerly
Hoeffer, Children's Acquisition of Sex-Role Behavior in Lesbian-.1totlh.r F, rmihls, 51 AMA J.
ORTHPSYCHIATRY 536 (1981); Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Stol' o! SelI.cstcau of
Adolescent Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heteras,11tial .0t1th;, in
HoMoSEXuAirry AND THE FAMmy 123 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989). Martha Kirpalriclk ct
al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Sirvey, 51 AMi . ,a lusCo, '. 545
(1978); Brian Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COo,tmwO 544 (19791, Jay
P. Paul, Growing up with a Gay, Lesbian. or Biserual parent Aln Eiplaratory Stir, of
Experiences and Perceptions (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni% ersity of California
(Berkley)(on file with author); Richard Rees, A Comparison ofChldren of Lesbians andSmn ',e
Heterosexual Mothers on Three Measures of Socialization (1979) (unpubhhzd Pit D
Dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology (Berl:eley)kjon file t, ith autlor)
109See generally Patterson, supra note 108. at 1025 (analyzing and di cu.ing seeral
studies that look at the intellectual, psychological and psychosexual impact of children ri-_d
by homosexuals).
10 See Flaks, supra note 93, at 364-65, citing Golombok ct al,. supra note I W. at 554;
see Green et.al., supra note 108, at 179-80; Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 103. at 54141
..See id. at 365-68.
"
2See id. at 369-70, citing Golombok et al., supra note 103, at 564. Green. supra note
108, at 693.
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to be homosexual." 14 Similarly, research had shown that there is no
difference in the mental health, self-esteem, peer relationships, moral
development, or intellectual abilities between children raised in
homosexual homes versus those raised in heterosexual homes. I 
5
Economic Barriers
Gays and lesbians face two economic barriers when attempting to
utilize assisted reproductive technologies. First, assisted reproductive
technology can be expensive, especially for gay men who must use
surrogacy. 16 Second, because of prejudice against homosexuals, gays
and lesbians are likely to be denied any insurance reimbursement."1
7
Artificial insemination is inexpensive compared to surrogacy
because it only requires access to sperm. Sperm can be free if it is
procured from a willing donor, or it can be bought through a sperm
bank or a physician's office for an average cost of $85-$130."'8 Sperm
can be introduced into the woman with a physician's help, or else one
can self inseminate, reducing physician fees." 9 However, insemination
may take several attempts before conception occurs.12 0 Thus, repeated
attempts at insemination may end up costing thousands of dollars.
Surrogacy is much more expensive because the process involves a
third party and requires more technology. A surrogate mother will
rarely provide services for free and her fees alone may cost at least
$10,000."' In her book, The Lesbian and Gay Parenting Handbook,
April Martin argues that surrogates deserve payment because the
process requires "many months of negotiations, screenings and
inseminations; 24 hour-a-day child care over the course of nine months;
countless hours at medical appointments; time lost from work; and
health risks, emotional upheaval, and possible permanent bodily
"
3See id. at 370, citing Bozett supra note 108, at 47; Miller, supra note 108, at 547.
3
'
4See id. Flaks, supra note 93, at 370.
"'See id. at 355-58, citing Golombok et.al., supra note 108, at 565; Gottman, supra note
108, at 188-89.
"
6See infra notes and accompanying text.
17 Even if an insurance company were to pay for infertility services, it is likely that the
policy would only pay if the person was married and diagnosed by a physician as infertile.
"
8See The Lesbian Mom's Webpage at http://www.lesbian.orgmoms/tonor.htn.
"'tSee MARTiN, supra note 16, at 58.
'
2
°See id.
12 'See Kerian, supra note 45, at 165.
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changes."122 After medical and legal bills are calculated, the entire
final cost of a surrogacy arrangement may be $20,000-S30,000 or
more.' 3 Therefore, in reality, surrogacy is only available to wealthier
gay men.
Gays and lesbians are unlikely to receive monetary assistance in
their quest to access assisted reproductive technologies. First,
approximately thirty percent of all private insurance companies refuse
to cover assisted reproductive technology. 124 Second, even if a gay or
lesbian had an insurance policy covering assisted reproductive
technologies, they would most likely not receive benefits because they
are not medically infertile, 2.and, therefore, the procedure is not
"medically necessary."' 126 Insurance companies, like other businesses,
are motivated to control costs and maximize profits.'2 7 One vay of
controlling costs is to place restrictive definitions of what treatment
they Nvill cover. 128 A medically necessary clause is a common
restriction found in health insurance contracts.' 29 But for their sexual
orientation, homosexuals are presumably otherwise fertile.
130
122See MARTIN, supra note 16. at 108. A demographic study inoluing 1 'surrogate
women showed that the typical surrogate mother is married with tvo children. tventi-hit
years old, had thirteen years of formal education and v.as employed full-tine Y' AiiJre2r,.
supra note 32, at 674, citing Hillary Hanafin, Surrogate Plarenting lk5,:oss llarza
Bonding 2 (August 28, 1987) (unpublished paper presented at .1 P-14 %0mnt . 1uwn IWI
They had positive pregnancies and enjoyed being pregnant. Sce i None of the V.omen
that money was the deciding factor in considering w'hether to become inolwd in the
arrangement. See id.
123See MARTrN, supra note 16, at 112.
'
2 4See D'Andrea Millisap, Sex, Lies, and Insurance: Eqp!over-Privtd Ikalth
Insurance Coverage ofAbortion and hifertilit, Services and the ADA. 22 AM. J L, & Mrw 51,
57 (1996). However, at least nine states (California, Connecticut, Arkansas. Havaii, Illinois.
Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Texas) statutorily mandate some coerage for
assisted reproductive technologies. See id. at 59.
'2Medical infertility is defined as the inability to conceive after one % ear of interc,urse,
without contraception. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE Oj LIFE AD rlI L,W. Assi-iwL
REPRODUCTIvE TECHNOLOGIES 10 (1998).
126See generally Mark Hall. Health Insurers' Assessment of .ldcal e, . 140 U
PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992) (discussing the appropriateness of a decreased role of the court in the
assessment of"medical necessity").
127See Angela R. Holder. Fzuiding Ihiuovatve Medical Treatment. 57 ALt 1. RtL' 795.
796 (1994).
'
28See id.
'
29See Mark Hall, Health h2surers'Assessment of.iledical Ncc ssitv. 140 U P,% L RLV,
1637, 1647 (1992).
1301 am presuming that if a homosexual were to engage in sexual relationhips V, ith a
member of the opposite sex, he or she would prove to be fertile over tine,
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Legal Barriers
Increasingly, courts have had to address the legal issues surrounding
the use of assisted reproductive technologies.' 31 Most often they have
dealt with custodial and parental challenges. 13  However, in surrogacy
cases, courts have additionally had to consider the legality and
enforceability of surrogate compensation and of the contractual
arrangement itself.133 In response, the federal, as well as several state
governments, have enacted statutes in an attempt to more clearly define
the rights and responsibilities of those using assisted reproductive
technologies.' 34  Case law continues to define rights and
responsibilities where statutory enactment is lacking or incomplete.
35
Both statutory and case law create real and "constructive" legal barriers
to assisted reproductive technologies. 36 Real barriers are created when
statutes criminalize the reproductive technology or an aspect of the
technology. 137  Such barriers are common to both homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike. "Constructive" barriers are created when statutory
and case law produce significant disincentives138to accessing
reproductive technologies because homosexuals will not have equal
legal standing in defending a parental or custodial challenge. 139 Gay
men are particularly vulnerable to legal barriers because they must deal
with statutory and case law involving both artificial insemination and
133As assisted reproductive technology becomes more utilized, courts will invariably
need to address the myriad of legal issues.
132See generally Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986): In re Baby
M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988): Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (discussing custody
rights of surrogate parents).
'See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988).
13 4See infra notes 141-220 and accompanying text.
135Many states have not enacted any statues dealing with assisted reproductive
technologies. In those states, or where statues fail to address a particular legal issue, courts
must rely on common law application of legal issues. See discussion and footnotes, infra notes
141-220.
136See discussion and footnotes, infra notes 205-220.
137See discussion and footnotes, infra 141-220. For example, a real barrier exists if a
statute makes it criminal to participate in a surrogacy arrangement.
'3sFor example, a lesbian may choose to avoid artificial insemination if the state's
statutory scheme would not provide her with protection against a parental challenge.
139See infra notes 205-220 and accompanying text.
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surrogacy, whereas lesbians must only deal with laws involving
artificial insemination.14
0
Statutory and Case Law as Barriers to Artificial Insemination
At least thirty-one states have enacted statutes addressing some aspect
of artificial insemination.' 4' Five of those states have statutory
language criminalizing artificial insemination if a licensed physician
does not perform it.142 For example, Georgia's statute provides, in
relevant part: "Physicians and surgeons licensed to practice
medicine... shall be the only persons authorized to administer or
perform artificial insemination... Any other person or persons... shall
be guilty of a felony. . . ,,143 This creates a real barrier for gays and
lesbians, as vell as heterosexuals, wishing to utilize artificial
insemination. Many prefer to self-inseminate in the privacy of their
own home,1athus avoidin medical professionals with perceived or real
discriminatory practices. 145 Requiring the involvement of a physician
140Because surrogacy arrangements typically involve artificial insemination of the
surrogate mother, gay men will be subject to laws affecting both surrogacy and artificial
insemination.
141See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Michie 1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25,20-045 (1993); Alt%.
CODE § 9-10-201-202 (West 1991); CAL FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-4-106 (West 1997): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-771 to 45a-779 (West 19931; FL, STAT.
ANN. § 742.11 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21, 43-34-42 (199 1); IDAitO CODE . 39-
5401 to 5408 (Michie199S); ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. § 750 s 40!1 (Smith-Hurd 1999). LU.A
STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to 23-130 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46. 4B (We-t 1994); Mitci
COmp. LAws ANN. § 700.111 (West 19995); MnN. STAT. ANN § 257.56 (IWet 1998); Mo:T0.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1997); NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.061 (Michie 199,3 NH. STAT. ANN. §
168-B: 1-32 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1 1-6
(Michie 1989); N.Y. DoM. RL. LAW § 73 (McKinney's Cons. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-
1 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§14-18-01 to 14-18- 07 (1997. Onio REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30 to 3111.38 (Anderson 1996); OKla. STAT. ANNr tit 10 § 551-551
(West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239 to 109.247, 677.360, 677 365 (Butterorth 1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996); TEx. FAml. CODE ANN, § 151.101 (West 1996)- VA-
CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 165 (Michie 1995); WASH. Rrv. CODE ANN. § 2626 050 (Wet
1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891A0 (West 1997); Wvo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1999),
142See ARK. CODE § 9-10-201-202 (West 1991): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 45a-771 to
45a-779 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21, 43-34-42 (1991): liiO Cour § 39-5401 tt)
5408 (Michiel998); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.239 to 109.247, 677.360. 677,365 tButt!rV-orth
1990)
141 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21, 43-34-42 (1991).
'4"See MAR7TN, supra note 16, at 49.
145See Vickie L. Henry, A Tale of Three Women: A Surv,'j of the Rights and
Responsibilities of Unmarried Women who Conceive by Alternative Insemination and a Moki
for Legislative Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 285, 288-89 (1993).
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may also create a financial barrier to those who cannot afford the
additional medical costs.
146
Artificial insemination statutes also create constructive barriers for
gays and lesbians because parentage and custodial issues can be
challenged. 147  In 1973, the federal government promulgated the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 148  The purpose of the Act was to
establish a legal relationship between child and parent.'49 Thirteen
states have modeled their insemination statutes after the UPA.B5 0 The
UPA provides, in relevant part:
a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician
and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in
law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must
be in writing and signed by him and his wife...
b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a
married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father
of a child thereby conceived.151
A clear reading of this statute suggests that a sperm donor may assert
parental rights in two ways. First, the donor could argue that the
woman is not afforded statutory protection if the sperm he provides is
not given to a physician for use in the insemination. Case law supports
146See MARTIN, supra note 16, at 49.
147See infra notes 205-220 and accompanying text.
148Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987)[hereinafter UPA].
149See id.
'
5 See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Michie 1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (West 1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 750 s 40/1 (Smith-Hurd
1999); MINN. STAT. ANN § 257.56 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1997); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 126.061 (Michie 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 West 1993). N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.30 to 3111 .38 (Anderson 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West 1997):
WYo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1999).
"'
5 UPA, supra note 148 (emphasis added).
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this argument. 152 In Jhordan C. v. Maty K., the California Court of
Appeals found that the donor of a child conceived by insemination v as
the legal father because the woman did not utilize the services of a
physician, and was therefore, not afforded the protection of the
statute.1 53 Almost all states, even those not entirely modeled after the
UPA, have language which similarly suggest that statutory protection
will only be granted if the parties utilize the services of a physician.1
54
The second way a sperm donor may assert parental rights is to
challenge the statute by arguing that only legally married couples, not
unmarried women, are granted presumptive parental rights. All states'
statutes presume that if a woman's husband consents to artificial
insemination, he is deemed the legal, natural father.15 Courts will
interpret the statute "in such a way as to facilitate a finding of one
mother and one father."' 156 The Supreme Court supports this strong
presumption of legitimacy and the recognition one mother and one
father. 15 7 In Michael H v. Gerald D., Michael H. conceived a child
while having an affair with a woman married to Gerald D.'* Even
though Michael H had an opportunity to establish a relationship with
the child because he lived with the child's mother for some time while
she remained married to Gerald D., the Court upheld the Califbrnia
state law which presumed that the child born to a woman living with
her husband was the legal child of the husband. 15, The Court noted
that when a child is "born into an extant marital family, the natural
father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique
opportunity of the husband of the marriage.... ." Thus in custodial
and parental cases in jurisdictions with statutory language similar to
California's, courts are likely to interpret both statutory and case law in
'"
2Jhordan, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
"
3See id. at 533-35 (Ct.App. 1986).
'-See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1997); N.H, STAT A% - , I-B 1-32 I'l1041.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1992); TrENN. COvtE A. h 6,:-3-3W* I 110h).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.101 (West 1996) (states that do not hae Ian ujyc requIira tire
services of a physician.).
'"See supra note 150.
'"
56Henry, supra note 145, at 23.
'SfSee Micael H., 491 U.S. at 123-24.
ISSd. at 113.
'"See id. at 115.
16°Id. at 129.
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a way that grants parental rights to a single male sperm. 161
Consequently, a lesbian's legal standing against a donor is significantly
diminished because she cannot legally marry.
Interestingly, eight states that have adopted the UPAl' 2have
removed the word "married" in front of woman in part "b." 163 For
example, part "b" of California's artificial insemination statute states:
"the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for
use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of the child thereby
conceived."' 164 Thus, in those states, unmarried and married women are
seemingly granted similar statutory protection. However, even in those
states, the statute still contains part "b" that presumes that a married
woman's husband is the child's natural father. 165
Gay men using artificial insemination in surrogacy arrangements
face similar "constructive" barriers because their paternity can be
challenged. As noted above, statutory and case law favors a
presumption of paternal rights for men married to women who
conceive by artificial insemination. 16 6  Thus, a gay man who
inseminates a married woman, has significantly less legal standing
should a custody or visitation battle ensue.
Statutory and Case Law as Barriers to Surrogacy Arrangements
Gay men face additional real and constructive barriers when using
surrogacy arrangements. Real barriers are created when statutes
criminalize the surrogacy arrangement itself167or criminalize the
161in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 2128, the Supreme Court indicated that. providing that he
demonstrate a willingness to take on the responsibilities of parenthood, an unwed father's
constitutional rights changed if the mother was not married.
162Se CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (West 1997);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 750 40/1 (Smith-Hurd 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 West 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.30 to 3111.38
(Anderson 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1997): Wis. STAT. ANN, § 891.40
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1999).
163See UPA, supra note 148.
164CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1999).
165See UPA, supra note 148.
166See supra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
167SeeARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (Michie
1997).
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payment of a surrogate. 16S Constructive barriers are created when the
contracts are found to be null and void. 6" ' If a surrogate mother
challenges custody and the contract is found to be void, family law and
the "best interest" of the child will determine the placement of the
child.170 Courts will exercise discretion in determining the factors and
how much weight to give each one.171  Given the prevalence of
prejudice against homosexuals, it is likely that if custody were
challenged, a judge would not find in favor of a gay man or gay
couple.1
72
Sixteen states have enacted statues addressing some aspect of
surrogacy. 173  States take one of four positions regarding surrogacy.
First, some states have made surrogacy arrangements prohibited and
punishable. 174 Second, some states permit surrogacy arrangements, but
compensation to a surrogate is illegal and punishable.17 5  Other states
do not specifically make surrogacy contracts illegal, but recognize them
'
6SSee KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1999); MICHI Co.p L%,,.s AN% %
722.851-853 (West 1997); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 122, 123 (MelMnne:, 199g. Supp 4 l)).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE At,,NN §26 26.210 to 0 26 26J2
(West 1997).
169See IND. CODE ANN. § 21-20-1-1 to 20-3 (Bums 1997); LA REV. STAT AN-. ' 2713
(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-13-01 to 14-1W-07
(Michie 1997).
170See generally Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and
Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267 (19S7) (discussing and ana1Nzing the leqal thzro
of "the best interest of the child").
171See id. at 268.
'1See supra notes 131-140 and accompanying text.
'
3See Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (West 1991); Ar-. CODE AtNtN , 9-10-201 fWc-t
1991); D.C CODE ANN. § 16-401-02 (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ANtN-. §74215, 742,16 0 e
1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 21-20-1-1 to 20-3 (Bums 1997); Ky. REV STAT. A%%' 19, 59J
(Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2713 (West 1991); MICH, COp L Ar;% 722 k"51-
853 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1995); NEV. REV, STAT A%' q 124 045
(Michie 1998); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B: I to B:32 (1994. Supp 19913), NY D',i REL
LAW § 122, 123 (McKinney 1998, Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT, CumE , 14-13-101 to 14-1-07
(Michie 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Miehie1995); VA. CODE AN' t, 20-156 To 165
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210 to 26.26.260 (West 1997)
174SeeARvz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218; D.C CODEANN § 16-401-02.
'
75See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1999); MICH. Co:w, LA%,s ANtN. §
722.851-853 (West 1997); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122, 123 (Mel!inney 1993, Supp, 1999),
UTAH CODEANN. § 76-7-204 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ArN. § 26.26-210 to 26,26,260
(West 1997).
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as void and unenforceable. 176 Finally, some states find that surrogacy
contracts are enforceable provided certain regulatory measures are
met. 177 The following paragraphs will discuss each of these variations.
Arizona and Washington D.C. prohibit surrogacy contracts.1
7 8
Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Utah, and Washington prohibit and
make it illegal to compensate a surrogate. 179  States that expressly
prohibit surrogacy arrangements create patent legal barriers. Those
states that prohibit remuneration suggest that surrogacy arrangements
are permissible as long as the surrogate is not compensated. 18°
However, in reality those statutes may create just as significant a
barrier. Few women are unwilling or unable to perform surrogacy
services without compensation. 181 Thus, criminalizing payment to a
surrogate often renders surrogacy untenable.
Several statues, while not criminalizing surrogacy arrangements,
find the contract to be void and unenforceable. 182 The result is that in
those states, gay men will not have statutory protection in defending
themselves should the surrogate challenge parental custody.
t76See IND. CODE ANN. § 21-20-1-1 to 20-3 (Bums 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2713
(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 to 14-18-07
(Michie 1997).
'77See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15, 742.16 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045
(Michie 1998); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:I-B:32 (1994, Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §
20-156 to 165 (1995).
17sSeeARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218; D.C CODE ANN. § 16-401-02.
'"See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1999) (no one may be party to a contract
that would pay a woman for her being artificially inseminated and later agreeing to terminate
her parental rights in the child); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851, 722.857, 722859 (West
1997) ($10,000 fine and/or one year imprisonment for a party to the arrangement and $50. 000
and/or five years imprisonment for one who assists in the contract); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
122, 123 (McKinney 1998, Supp. 1999) (provides a civil penalty of $500.00 for a party to a
contract and a $10,000 fine for those who arrange the contract); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204
(Michie 1995) (no person... may be a party to a contract for profit or gain in which a woman
agrees to undergo artificial insemination.., and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a
child born as a result); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210 to 26.26.260 (West 1997)
(compensation for arranging or participating in a surrogacy arrangement is prohibited and
considered a gross misdemeanor).
'
8
°See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1999); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.851-853 (WEST 1997); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122, 123 (McKinney 1998 & Snpp. 1999);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210 to 26.26,260
(West 1997).
'
31See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
'
52See IND. CODE ANN. § 21-20-1-1 to 20-3 (Bums 1997): LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2713
(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 to 14-18-07
(Michie 1997).
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Four states have statutes that will enforce a surrogacy contract if
certain conditions are met.' S3 These states have modeled their statutes
in part, after the Uniform Status of Children Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA). 184 The purpose of the USCACA was to protect the well
being of children born as a result of assisted conception.'3 5 Alternative
A offers the states "a framework under which such agreements are
given effect under limited and prescribed circumstance."( Sections
six through nine define the requisite circumstances. 137 Alternative A
states in relevant part, "A surrogate, her husband, if she is married, and
the intended parents may enter into a written agreement .... ,l8 The
USCACA defines intended parents as "a man and a women married to
each other, who enter into an agreement under this (Act) .... 1.t"N
Virginia has officially adopted the USCACA. l 4U The other states have
similar statutory language.' 91 In these states gay men are likely to be
denied statutory protection because they are unable to legally marry.
Only two states have statutes that do not affirm statutory
protection based the status of marriage. 192  Washington's statute
suggests that an unmarried man could enter into a surrogacy
-'See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15. 742.16 (West 1997). NEv. REV SrAT A% \ 124 C145
(Michie 1998); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16S-B: 1 to B32 (1994 & Supp 1993t 1, VA CuUJUE
ANN. § 20-156 to 165 (1995).
""See Uniform Status of Children Assisted Conception Act. USCACA 91B U L A, 191
(West Supp. 1999) [hereinafter USCACA].
ISSSee id
86USCACA, supra note 184, at 197-204.1871Id.
lSsUSCACA, supra note 184. at 198. Alternative B declares surrogaeN arrangement- to
be null and void. The surrogate mother and her husband, if married, are presumed tha natural
parents of the child. USCACA, 5(b) 9B U.L.A. 204-205. North Daota has ijupted
Alternative B. See supra note 110.
... USCACA, I Definitions, 9B U.L.A. 194 (West Supp, 1999),
"93See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 to 165 (1995).
'"
tSee FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15, 742.16 (West 1997) Ithe surro tA cklntrazt is
enforceable only if the surrogate is at least 18 years old and the commi ioning couple Is at
least 18 years old and legally married); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN, § 126.045 (Michie 1993) tt.o
persons whose marriage is valid, may enter into a surrogacy contract); N H REV- STAT, ANN
168-B: 1- 13:32 (1994 & Supp. 1993) ("intended parents' are defined as persgons ,ho are
married to each other.... ).
')92See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210-26.26.260 (%.est 1997); Ant-.. CODE A%"I. §
9-10-201 (West 1991).
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arrangement if the surrogate relinquishes her parental rights. 193
However, Washington is one of the states that prohibits and punishes
payment to a surrogate. 194 Thus while a gay man in Washington may
have some legal protection because the statute does not require legal
marriage, he still faces a barrier by not being able to compensate a
surrogate. Arkansas's extremely liberal statute is the only one that
specifically acknowledges that an unmarried man may contract with a
woman to bear his child.'95 It states that the child born as a result of a
surrogacy agreement is "the child of (1) the biological father and the
woman intended to be the mother if the man is married; or (2) the
biological father only if he is unmarried .... 196
In states lacking surrogacy statutes, courts will be forced to
individually address the issues raised. Courts will create law by taking
one of the four positions described above. Given the controversial
nature of surrogacy, many courts are likely to follow the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in the Baby M case and hold that surrogacy
arrangements are void and unenforceable. 97  In Baby M, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable
on two grounds: (1) surrogacy contracts violated the states adoption
laws because it was akin to baby selling; 198 and (2) surrogacy contracts
violated public policy. 199 It is the public policy issues that may provide
support for other jurisdictions to reject surrogacy contracts. The
Supreme Court Baby M addressed four public policy issues."' First, it
found that that the exchange of money was contrary to the child's best
interest because "the child is sold without regard for whether the
purchasers will be suitable parents." 20' Second, the court suggested
that surrogacy is a form of baby selling, resulting in the "exploitation of
193See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210-26.26.260 (West 1997) (surrogate parenting
contract is defined as an agreement in which a women not married the contributor of sperm
agrees to conceive a child and voluntarily relinquish her parental rights in the child),
'
94See id. at 26.26.250 (compensation for arranging or participating in a surrogacy
contract is prohibited).
195SeeARK. CODEANN. § 9-10-201 (West 1991).
'
96See id.
'
97See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
"
9 See id. at 1240-42.
""See id. at 1246-50.
2
.See id at 1227, 1241-42.201See id. at 1241.
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all parties involved. 2 °2 Third, the court noted that surrogacy contracts
violated public policy by providing permanent separation of a child
from his mother.20 3  Finally, the court found that surrogacy
arrangements were potentially placing a child without regard to the
interest of the natural mother of the child.204 Given the current status of
statutory law, gay men are likely to be "constructively" barred from
surrogacy arrangements because their actions will either be prohibited
or unenforceable against a surrogate mother challenging her parental
rights. Deciding to enter into a surrogacy arrangement is costly and
requires a sufficient amount of emotional energy. As a result, many
gay men may not be willing to enter into surrogate arrangements
without legal protection.
Second Parent Adoption Law as a "Constructive" Barrier
One reason that gay and lesbian couples seek assisted reproductive
technologies is to create a nuclear family.205 Because gays and lesbians
can not legally marry, their family units are not recognized as legal
entities.206 Therefore, in order to establish legal parental rights, the
non-biological parent must petition the court to adopt the child through
a co-parent or second parent adoption.207  Unfortunately, many
homosexuals will face additional legal barriers when trying to do so.
Like physicians, many judges and legislators hold prejudices against
homosexuals. 208  Statutory and case law often reflects these
prejudices. 20 9 For example, Florida and New Hampshire's statutes
202See In re Baby A, 537 A.2d at 1241-42 ("the negative consequence of bah. bu ing are
potentially present in the surrogacy context, especially the potential fur placing and alopting a
child without regard to the interests of the child or the natural mother"1
2
°
3See id at 1241-1242; see also id at 1246-1247 (Public Folhc% dictate!; that a child Liz
raised by both his natural parents.)
""See id at 1242.
205Pressley & Andrews, supra note 1, at A22.
205While no state currently recognize gay and lesbian mariage. Itasi. Alas!a and
Vermont have challenged the issue on constitutional grounds. &e Bahr v Le. in 852 P 2d
441 (1993).
207See Maria Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating anmthes Thwrvn 'Iz Srrd-G4 ,
Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 Am. UJ, GENDEr & L D 183. 233
(1995).203See Flaks, supra note 93 at 36S-71; Patterson supra note 99 at 19338
2 09See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 630.42 (West 1997); NH, REV, STAT A,,,., $ 170-B 4 (1994);
see also In re Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994); Alison D. %, Virginia M . 572 1 E.2d
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specifically deny homosexuals the right to adopt. 210 Additionally,
Connecticut's statute allows the state to consider the sexual orientation
of the adoptive parents when granting custody. 21 1 By jurisdiction,
courts have historically denied second parent adoptions2 12and custodial213
and visitation rights to the non-biological co-parent. Some courts
have refused to grant custodial or visitation rights to the non-biological
co-parent solely because they were homosexual.2 14
The effect is to leave the non-biological parent with no legal
standing to assert parenting privileges. Thus, if the relationship erodes,
the non-biological parent is left to the caprice of the biological parent in
terms of custodial or visitation rights. Similarly, if the biological parent
dies or otherwise become incapacitated, the child would legally be
without a parent.
Fortunately, several jurisdictions have begun to grant second
parent adoptions.21 5 Some courts will liberally interpret the state's
adoption laws.2 16 For example, the lesbian co-parent in B.L. VKB. was
able to successfully adopt her partner's biological child.2 17 Vermont's
adoption statute said "A person or husband or wife... may adopt any
27 (1991) (holding woman who has live-in relationship with child's mother not a parent under
the New York statute).2
=
0See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 630.42 (West 1997) (the statue provides that "No person
eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual)- N,H, R v. SrAT.
ANN. § 170-B:4 (1994) (the statute provides that "Any Individual Not A Minor And Not A
Homosexual May Adopt").2 1
'See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 1993).212See In re Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d at 682-83.2 13See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991). In this case, the parents of the
children were lesbians who had been in long term relationships that ended. The non-biological
parent attempted to assert custodial or visitation rights. In it's holding, the New York Supreme
Court denied such rights to the non-biological parent.214See G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the trial
court's decision to grant the father custody because his former wife was involved in a lesbian
relationship who showed affection to her lover in front of her child. The court found that this
created a "unhealthy environment" for the child.); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W,2d 78, 81-2
(1981) (the court of appeals denying custody to the mother because homosexual relationships
were not legally recognized and the child may suffer social disapproval).2 
"See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993); In re Tammy. 619 NRE,2d 315.
319 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. Sup, Ct. 1992). see
also Patterson, supra note 99, at 196 (1996) (listing and citing to cases in additional
jurisdictions-Alaska, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania and New Jersey-where second parent
adoptions have been granted).2 16See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-101 (Supp. 1998).2171n re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275(Vt. 1993).
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other person as his or their heir ..."213 The court found that as a single
person, the lesbian co-parent was allowed to legally adopt.
21
"
Despite advances in co-parent adoptions, many jurisdictions still
deny custodial or visitation rights to non-biological co-parents.-
Moreover, many jurisdiction have yet to decide these issues, and it is
reasonable to assume that some of those jurisdictions are likely to find
against a non-biological parent's rights. Thus, the inability to
successfully adopt their non-biological child creates an additional
"constructive" barrier.
CHALLENGING THE BARRIERS
Gays and lesbians wisling to fight these barriers to reproductive
technologies face an uphill battle. However, there are both
constitutional and common-law grounds for challenging current laws.
The arguments will need to be creative and persuasive. Another
remedy to reproductive barriers is legislative reform. The follow ing
subsections will address a series of barriers and possible remedies.
Social, Moral and Ethical Barriers
A physician's religious or personal beliefs constitute the single most
pervasive reason that gays and lesbians are denied access to assisted
reproductive technologies.Y' While these discriminatory practices
based on personal beliefs are beyond the reach of constitutional
challenges, a gay or lesbian might bring a common law claim based on
violations of contract law.
22
Challenges Based on Contract Law
Gays and lesbians may be able to bring a breach of contract claim if a
physician refuses to provide treatment because they are homosexual. 2 3
215VT. STAT. tit. 15 § 431-454 (repealed). The statute %%as later repaled and repLcd
with even more liberal, more specific language regarding the rights of non-biolou.cal parent-; to
adopt. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-101 (Supp. 1993).219See In re B.L. V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273.
22New York is an example of a jurisdiction that refuses to grant visitation rights to a
non-biological parent. See Alison D.. 572 N.E.2d at 29.
221See supra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.
222See Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977),
'See id
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The establishment of a physician/patient relationship creates a duty on
the part of the physician to continue care.224 Absent such relationship,
physicians are under no duty to provide care. 225 With assisted
reproductive technologies, physicians determine whom they treat based
on information obtained in the screening/initial evaluation. 2 2  Thus, it
is only after a physician affirmatively agrees to provide treatment that a
physician/patient relationship exists. However, it is arguable that an
contractual relationship exists even at the time of the initial
evaluation/screening.
Since express written contracts are rarely a part of a
physician/patient interaction, an implied contract provides the basis for
the patient/physician relationships. 227 When a patient comes to a
physician's office, he or she is impliedly offering to enter into a
contract with a physician.228 When the physician examines the patient,
he or she accepts the offer and a contract is created. 229 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a physician/patient relationship was formed
when the physician "had granted an appointment at a designated time
and place for the performance of a specific medical service, one within
the defendant's professional competence.,, 230  A gay or lesbian can
argue that a physician/patient relationship existed both at the time the
appointment was made and at the time of the initial evaluation.
Therefore, absent a valid medical justification for denying treatment, an
arbitrary decision not to treat based on homosexuality constitutes a
breach of contract.
Cost Barriers
Absent sweeping legislative reform, there is little that gays and lesbians
can do regarding the cost of assisted reproductive technologies. Gays
and lesbians will receive financial assistance for services related to
assisted reproductive technology only if four conditions are met. First,
state or federal governments must mandate that all insurance companies
provide for treatments related to assisted reproductive technology.
224See FURROW, supra note 23, at 284.225See id.226See OTA SURVEY, supra note 13, at 9.227See FURROW, supra note 28, at 284-85.22SSee id.229See id.
23°Lyons, 239 S.E.2d at 105 (Va. 1977).
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Second, statutes must exclude the language of "medically necessary" as
well as exclude or broaden the definition of infertility. Third, statues
must exclude language that suggests or specifies that only married
couples will receive benefits. Finally, legislation must mandate same
sex partnership health benefits.
Approximately 70% percent of insurance companies provide for
some form of assisted reproductive technology. 23 1 Moreover, at least
nine states have passed legislation requiring coverage for treatment
related to infertility.232  However, most insurance companies and all
nine states, provide benefits for assisted reproductive technology, only
for "medically necessary" treatments related to the diagnosis of
"infertility. ' 233 For example, Connecticut's statute requires insurance
companies to offer insurance providing "medically necessary expenses
for the diagnosis or treatment of infertility." 234 Infertility is defined as
the inability to conceive after one year of intercourse vithout
contraception. 235 Treatment that is medically necessary is typically
defined as treatments that require a physicians order, are recognized as
the appropriate treatment for the illness, and are not experimental in
nature.236 By definition, gays and lesbians are not medically infertile.
rather, they are constructively infertile because they do not have sexual
intercourse with members of the opposite sex.237 Therefore, assisted
reproductive technologies would not be considered medically necessary
231See D'Andra Millsap, Sex, Lies and Health Jnsurance Ern, phr-Pr.udd lcfth
Insurance Coverage of Abortion and Infertili4, Services and tw A.DA, 2- Am-, JL & MiD. 41.
53-54 n. 1, 23 (1996), citing ALAN GuTmiAcHER INsTrITrE, Ur.EvEN At.D UNEQu.AL',
INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVicEs 9 (1995).
232See ARK. CODE § 23-85-137 (1994); CAL. HEALTH AIND SAFETV CODE - 1374 55 91 B)
(1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33a-536 (1997), HAW. REV. STAT. § 43lA-1 16 5 $197). 215
ILL. Co, w. STAT. §5I356m(c) (1998), MD. CODE ANN. § 15-10cl13llt 197). MI ss
CODE tit. 211 §37.03 (1998); RI. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (b) (1997). TEX NS col) A' %
3.51-6 3A (e)(3)(1998).
2 3See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Models of Rati.nmnopq Ikalti In :mrrs
Assessment of Medical Necessijy. 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637. 1644-1662 (1992) IdI uU ifl th-e
rationale for including these clauses in insurance contracts). Soo also supra note 223.
234CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (1997).
"
5 See TASK FORCE. supra note 125, at 10.
236 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 233, at 1647 n.32, citing Dozza v. Crum & Foztcr
Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D.N.J. 1989).
237By constructively infertile, I mean that gays and lesbians are infertile ont) b.CauSe
their sexual orientation prevents them from procreating via hetero ewual intercourze Of
course, it is possible that some gays or lesbians who attempt to conceile by enq n g in
heterosexual relations, may eventually be diagnosed as medically infertile
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for a homosexual who could "technically" reproduce by lesser intrusive
means. Thus, it is unlikely that the inability to procreate secondary to
homosexuality will be recognized as an illness requiring "appropriate
treatment."
In order to provide the most liberal of coverage for gays and
lesbians, statutes must also exclude language that suggests or states that
only married couples will receive benefits, and they must require that
all governmental and private employers extend health benefits to same
sex partners. Several states currently limit coverage to married
couples.238 Since homosexuals are unable to legally marry, they would
clearly be denied benefits. Extending insurance coverage to same sex
partners would ensure that even if the biological parent undergoing
treatment with assisted reproductive technology did not have health
insurance, he or she would be able to receive benefits under their
partner's policy.
Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that in the next few years all
four, let alone one, of the above conditions will be met. Insurance
companies, like any other business, search for ways to maximize profits
and contain costs. For example, insurance companies already deny
coverage for experimental, but life saving treatments for forms of
cancer. 2 39 Since basic medical costs increase each year, neither the
government nor private insurance companies are unlikely to expand
already existing coverage. There are especially unlikely to expand
coverage to include individuals who could, but for their homosexuality,
otherwise have children. Thus gays and lesbians are left to individually
finance the costs of assisted reproductive technologies. This will be
particularly difficult for gay men given the phenomenally high cost of
surrogacy.
Legal Barriers
There are three potential remedial actions for real and constructive
legal barriers. One remedy is to challenge the barriers as a violation of
one's due process and equal protection rights.240 Gay men have an
additional remedy in common law when challenging legal barriers to
23sHawaii, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Texas. See supra note 232.
239See generally Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB, L.
Rnv. 795 (1994) (discussing the denial of experimental treatment by insurance companies).240See infra notes 242-285 and accompanying text.
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surrogacy.24 The final remedy is to propose and urge legislative
reform that viii challenge all the legal barriers that gays and lesbians
encounter.
Constitutional Challenges
Currently, there are no statutes that specifically ban access to artificial
insemination by gays and lesbians. However, in 1995, three states
introduced legislation which would have prohibited or made
burdensome, access by single women.242 Fortunately these propositions
were never passed.243  Two states currently prohibit and criminalize
surrogacy2aaand five states criminalize artificial insemination if a
physician does not perform it.245 'While it is less clear whether strong
constitutional arguments can be made for constructive barriers,
arguments may be made for those laws that provide for patent bans
under the auspices of substantive due process and equal due protection
and equal protection.
24 6
Substantive Due Process Arguments
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether there
is a constitutional right of access to assisted reproductive technology.
However, it has considered cases addressing related issues of
procreation such as state ordered sterilization, contraception and
abortion.247 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court invalidated a
241See id.242Harlow, supra note 9, at 175 n.8, citing S. Cong. Res. 75. 18th State Leg ilav, an
1995) (requesting that the Department of Health consider , hether sprn bn!-L .huuld h
prohibited from selling sperm to single women and be limited to alltmin artiicial
insemination only for infertile couples); S. File No. 1785, 79th Leg Se-:s IMin 14451
(barring single women from using artificial insemination unless a male pro% ideri an aftida% it to
the inseminator before insemination stating that he w:ill sign doeuments e labh'-1hm_ hr'
paternity); H.B. No. 2303, 68th Leg. (Or. 1995) (prohibiting ph~sicians friim rtriLani
artificial insemination on single women).243See id.244See ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991); D C, C/i A% , 16-4111-012
(Michie 1997).245See ARK. CODE § 9-10-201-202 (West 1991); CONN. GEu. STAT. A , . 45a-771 to
45a-779 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21, 43-34-42 (1991); IDitO CuoE 39-5401 to
5408 Michie1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.239 to 109.247, 677,360, 677 365
2
'
6See infra notes 247-285 and accompanying text.247See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S, 535 (1942) Iaddr ing the
constitutionality of mandatory sterilization); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S 479 I 1965)
(addressing the constitutionality of prohibiting contraceptte use b% mirricd c.uplcl'.
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statute that would have allowed the state to sterilize a repeat felon.2 48
Justice Douglas noted that the right to reproduce was ". . . a right which
is basic to the perpetuation of a race. . .,,249 In Griswold i'.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court invalidated the state's ban on the use
of contraceptives for married couples. 250  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the
Court extended it's holding from Griswold to include those who were
unmarried.251 Justice Brennan noted, "if the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single to be free of
unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 2 52
Finally, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman had the
right to terminate a pregnancy.2
53
Taken as a whole, it can be inferred that these decisions stand for a
constitutional right to procreate regardless of marital status. If the
Supreme Court were to adopt a broad interpretation of the right to
procreate to include a right to procreate using assisted reproductive
technologies, states would have the burden of justifying any restriction
on access to assisted reproductive technology.25 4 For example, if the
Supreme Court adopted a broad interruption, a state would have the
burden of justifying a statutory scheme that legally recognized artificial
insemination only with married couples.
However, it has been argued that the negative right to terminate or
prevent pregnancy does not imply a positive right to procreate. 255 A
negative right is the "right of forbearance, entitling an obligation upon
others to leave the claimant alone., 25 6  With assisted reproductive
technologies, the individual is entitled to be left alone without
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (plurality opinion) (extending Griswold's rationale to
unmarried couples); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (addressing the constitutionality of
prohibiting access to abortions).
24 See 316 U.S. at 538.249 zd. at 536.2a 0See 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).2 1 See 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (plurality opinion).2 2See id. at 453.253See 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).254See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation rights of the Unmarried 98
HARV. L. REV. 669, 677 (1985) [hereinafter Reproductive Technology].25 SSee id.256Laura Shanner, The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone W1rong. 40
MCGILL L.J., 823, 839 (1995).
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interference from the United States Government in matters regarding
individual autonomy and bodily integrity. A positive right is a claim
"of assistance or positive support which entails an obligation on
someone else to provide the goods or services required for the person to
exercise the right."257 Claiming a right to assisted reproduction
becomes positive because the parties require assistance in attempting to
realize their right to procreate.258 Two Supreme Court cases
demonstrate the Court's reluctance to extend the right to procreate.
259
In both Maher v Roe 60 and Harris iv McRae,-"'the Court noted that
although women had a right to an abortion, they did not a positive right
to the financial assistance in order to procure one.2 "2 The government
could argue that the same reasoning applies in this case--the
government does not have to provide the financial means to the
services, nor does have it have to statutorily mandate that assisted
reproductive technologies be available to all who seek the services.
Opponents might also argue that even if there were a right to
procreation by assisted reproductive technologies, that right does not
extend to homosexuals. In Bowers i. Hardwiek,23tflle Court upheld a
statute that criminalized homosexual sodomy acts.2 4 The Court
distinguished this case from the other cases establishing a procreative
right by stating that there was "no connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on
the other has been demonstrated., 265 The court rationalized its
proscription based on ancient history and tradition.2 " Specifically,
Justice White noted that "sodomy was a criminal offense at common
law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen states when
they ratified the Bill of Rights. 267 He further noted that "until 1961,
271d at 840.
2"Sd. at 841.
259See Maher v Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Harris v MeRa.e 44,; U S 297, 316
(1980).
26432 U.S. 464,474 (1977).
261448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
262See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; 448 U.S. at 316 (1980).
263478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).26
'See id.26
"Id. at 19 1.
c66See id. at 192-94.2671d. at 192.
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all fifty states outlawed sodomy... In concluding, Justice White
stated that the Court was unwilling to take a more expansive view of its
authority and discover new fundamental rights.269 Thus, it may be
inferred that in its holding, the Court excluded homosexuals from
constitutional protection in the areas of right to privacy, family and
procreation. 2
70
One commentator has argued, however, that Hardwick has no
bearing on a homosexual's right to procreate.271 Maria Hollandsworth
notes that assisted reproductive technology "does not involve any
sexual act with another person, and certainly does not invoke any
sodomy proscriptions." 272 Any sexual activity that is involved in
assisted reproductive technology is done solely for the purpose of
procreation, bringing it within the protection afforded all with regard to
reproductive autonomy.273 Although Ms. Hollandsworth argues
specifically from a gay man's perspective, her reasoning applies with
equal force to lesbians because any sexual activity related to artificial
insemination is done solely for the purpose of procreation.
Equal Protection Argument
Statutes that discriminate between married and unmarried individuals
and between men and women's reproductive rights may also violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause requires equal
treatment for individuals who are similarly situated.274 A gay man or a
lesbian's equal protection rights may be violated because many states
provide statutory protection of assisted reproductive technologies only
to married individuals. Thus, unmarried persons become a class who
are otherwise similarly situated but treated differently. Unmarried
persons are similarly situated because they could procreate (like
married persons) with the help of assisted reproductive technologies.
However, they are treated unequally because many statutes will only
grant legal access to assisted reproductive technologies to married
persons. A gay man's equal protection rights may be additionally
268See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193.
269See id. at 194.270See Hollandsworth, supra note 12, at 224.2 71See id.
2721d.
27 3See id.274See Kerian, supra note 45, at 122.
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violated because states that prohibit surrogacy leave men as the only
class of persons deprived of the right to procreate. Therefore, gay men
become a class who are otherwise similarly situated because they could
procreate, like heterosexuals, with the help of assisted reproductive
technologies. However, they are treated unequally because many
statutes criminalize and prohibit surrogacy arrangements.
The Supreme Court has determined that the right to procreate was
fundamental, and any ban on that right is subject to strict scrutiny. 2 75
With strict scrutiny, a state must show that it had a compelling interest
in creating its ban, and that the statute was narrowly drawn. 7 " With
assisted reproductive technology, a state would have to allege
differences between unmarried and married individuals, or between
men and woman, sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest in
denying unmarried individuals, or men, statutory protection with
assisted reproductive technologies. 277 The second step would require a
state to demonstrate that the ban was neither over nor under-
inclusive.2
7S
Under either equal protection arguments, the government would
likely raise two arguments for constituting compelling interests. First,
the state would argue that it has a compelling interest in safeguarding
the emotional and psychological well being of a child created by
assisted reproductive technologies. The state would argue that a child
born to an unmarried individual by assisted reproduction would be
psychologically harmed.279 The argument assumes that a child would
be psychologically harmed by having only one parent and it assumes
that children would be harmed if they knew they were conceived by
"alternative means. 280 The government would then have to
demonstrate that the ban was neither under nor over-inclusive. A
barrier to reproductive technologies by unmarried individuals is
arguably under inclusive because the assumption that learning about
275See CONSTITUTIONAL LA1,W. HORNBOOK SERIES, FIFTi EDITION UI l-03 ou Lo N.a!
& Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1995).2 761d.
277Similarly, in the case of surrogacy, the state would have to allege diftfereacca htvc n
men and women sufficient enough to demonstrate a compelling state iteract in binng
surrogacy.275See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 275 at 602.
279See Reproductive Technology' supra note 254. at 6S3.2SId
"
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alternative conception harms a child would also apply to children born
to married couples.s
2 8
The second argument that a state could make is that it has a
compelling interest in safeguarding public morals. The state would
argue that the notions of "traditional family" are threatened when
unmarried persons procreate. In a society where the composition of
those in traditional families is dramatically decreasing, that argument is
282 i twr
without merit. Even if it were a meritorious argument, any statute
that sought to protect notions of traditional family by barring access to
assisted reproductive technology would be over-inclusive.
283
If a state were challenged on a ban to surrogacy, it would likely
argue that it has a compelling interest in safeguarding the psychological
health of all parties involved. A surrogacy arrangement can
psychologically harm the surrogate mother who must relinquish a child
she gestated and gave birth to. The intended parent(s) could suffer
psychologically if a surrogate were to challenge custody. A child could
be harmed if he knew he was conceived by artificial means and then
given up by his mother.284 Even if the state's argument was sound, a
ban against surrogacy is under-inclusive because it fails to consider
other practices that would have a similar emotional impact on all
285parties.
As demonstrated, constitutional challenges are viable options for
gays and lesbians who are subjected to patent bans in accessing assisted
reproductive technologies. However, it will take more persuasive and
creative arguing to bring a constitutional challenge based on a
"constructive" barrier.
Common Law Arguments for Upholding Surrogacy Agreements
Gay men have an additional remedy to a surrogate mother challenging
her maternal rights in a surrogacy agreement. The landmark decision
in the California case Johnson v. Calvert set a precedent for a
2SISee id.
28ZSee Only One US. Family in Four is "Traditional," N, Y Times. Jan. 30. 1991, tt 19
(noting that, according to the 1990 census, only 26% of the nation's households consist of two
parents of the opposite sex living together with their children).283See Reproductive Technology, supra note 254, at 682.2
s
4See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.285For example, adoption is similarly emotionally entangled.
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contractual analysis of surrogacy arrangements. 22 In Johnson, the
surrogate mother threatened to not relinquish the child due to strained
relations.2S7 The plaintiffs petitioned the court to be recognized as the
genetic and legal parents of the child.233  In addition to finding the
plaintiffs to be the genetic parents, the trial court also held the
surrogacy arrangement was enforceable.SM The California Supreme
Court upheld the surrogacy agreement by looking to the parties'
intent.29 It determined that the plaintiffs intended to become parents
while the defendant agreed only to facilitate the procreation. 2 9 The
court cited the writings of two scholars in providing a rationale for their
decision. 292 Citing a legal scholar,293 the court noted, that the recent
developments in reproductive technology "dramatically extended
affirmative intentionally." 294  The court further noted "within the
context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained for ought
presumptively to determine legal parenthood." 295 Citing another legal
scholar, 2 96 the court noted that "the genetic relationship per se should
not be accorded priority in the determination of the parent-child
relationship in the surrogacy context .... "297
The Court recognized that parties entering into to a surrogacy
agreement do so willingly, voluntarily and based on an informed
decision. While not precedential outside of California, a gay man can
make a strong argument against a surrogate attempting to assert
parental rights by citing Johnson v. Calvert.
2s6Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784-85 (Cal, 1993).
2
'
7See id.2SSSee ict2
"See id.
2
' See id at 782.
"'Johnson, 851 P.2d at 733.
292See id
293See 851 P.2d 776 at 733 citing Marjorie M. Schultz Repro Juctwe Tcchnocq:, and
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrah t 1990 WI L REv. 297. 309.
(1990).
2951d., citing Schultz. supra note 277, at 323.
2"'See id. at 782, citing John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be .4 "Paren' The Claims
Of Biology As The Basis For Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353. 4 15,29 71d.
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Arguments for Comprehensive Legislative Reform
Current statutes addressing assisted reproductive technologies and
adoption by non-biological partners fail to reflect the reality that there
is an increasing number of non-traditional families being created z2 8
For example, a survey conducted in 1987 demonstrated that of 80,000
women using donor semen for artificial insemination, approximately
8,600 were unmarried and 1,700 of the 8,600 were lesbians.299 It is
likely that these numbers have significantly increased over the last
thirteen years. Moreover, it is likely the percentage of single
heterosexual women and lesbians utilizing artificial insemination was
underreported in 1987 because those groups are the ones most likely to
avoid involving a physician because of perceived or real
discrimination.30 0 While there is currently no data on the numbers of
gay men using surrogacy to create a family, it is likely that these
numbers are also increasing. 30 1 The language in most states' statutes
fails to provide adequate statutory protection for those of non-
traditional families who want to access assisted reproductive
technology. Thus, the federal government is urged to promulgate a
comprehensive statute that will define the rights and responsibilities of
all the parties involved in the assisted reproduction. This article
proposes a statute that will provide equal and uniform protection to
married heterosexuals, unmarried heterosexuals, and homosexuals
alike. Likewise, states are urged to adopt statutes in order to create
uniformity in the law. Uniformity provides for predictable and
consistent application.
Prior to providing a legislative model, it is important to discuss
those elements, currently in statutory schemes, which must be altered
or removed. First, statutory protection should not be predicated on the
involvement of a physician in the artificial insemination process. Such
a requirement is not legally sound because there is nothing about
artificial insemination that requires the skill or guidance of a
30230physician. The procedure poses very little risk to the woman,3 3and
298By non-traditional, I mean single heterosexual men and women as well as homosexual
individuals and couples.299See OTA SURVEY, supra note 1I, at 8.300See Henry, supra note 93 at 289.30
'See introduction and accompanying footnotes.302See JANE MATrES, SINGLE MOTHERS By CHOICE 26-36 (1994).303See id.
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as previously noted, it can be easily and safely accomplished in the
home setting.30 4 Some individuals may prefer to undertake the
procedure in the privacy of their own home. Moreover, as previously
mentioned, gays and lesbians are often denied access to such
procedures and are thus forced to self-inseminate.
30 5
Legislators should also remove any language that grants greater
statutory protection to married couples. As currently written, the UPA
grants superior statutory protection to a married woman by preventing a
sperm donor from asserting parental rights. Under part "a," the
husband of a married women undergoing artificial insemination is the
presumed legal father.30 6  Under part "b", the donor's rights are
automatically terminated if his semen is provided to a physician and
used with a married woman.30 7 As currently written, an unmarried
woman (including a lesbian) does not receive statutory protection. 303
Also, a gay man's paternal rights are automatically terminated if he is
using artificial insemination as part of a surrogacy arrangement with a
married woman.30 9 With regard to surrogacy, all states that validate the
agreement have language which suggest the contract will only be
enforced if the intended parents are a married couple.
A Model for Comprehensive Legislation Related to Issues of
Assisted Reproduction and Non-Biological Co-Parent Adoption
The following is a proposed model statue that would assist in
accomplishing the goal of securing access for gay men and lesbian
women to assisted reproduction. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
create a model legislative statue encompassing all forms of assisted
reproduction. However, to be truly comprehensive, such and act would
include those elements.
3
"See id.30S5ee supra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.30 Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9B U.L.A. 287 (19S7).
307See id.3
°
3See id.
3
.See id.
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1. DEFINITIONS:
(1) Assisted Reproduction: pregnancy resulting from the
fertilization of a donor's sperm and a recipient's egg
through the process of artificial insemination.
(2) Artificial Insemination: the introduction of semen into a
women's vagina or uterus, other than by sexual intercourse.
(3) Donor: an adult man, other than the recipient's husband if
she is married, who donates his sperm for the purpose of
artificial insemination.
(4) Donee: an adult female who receives a donor's sperm for use
in artificial insemination.
(5) Gestational Mother: a woman over the age of 18 who enters
into a written agreement to bear a child conceived through
artificial insemination for intended parent(s).
(6) Intended Parent(s): A single adult man, a single adult woman,
or an adult couple, regardless of gender, who agree, in
writing, to be the legal parents of the child conceived by
assisted reproduction.
(7) Adoptive Co-Parent: any person, of either gender, who enters
into a written agreement to be a legal parent of a child
conceived in part by the biological parent.
COMMENT
The word "adult" was purposefully added as a modifier. This
legislative body intends to include only those persons over the age of
eighteen. First, it is our belief that persons over eighteen can more
readily appreciate the rights, responsibilities and ramifications of
assisted reproduction. Second, only persons over eighteen can enter
into binding contractual agreements.
The definition of "intended parent(s)" was changed to
accommodate single men and women as well as married and unmarried
couples. Under this definition, the gender of the intended parents
becomes irrelevant to establishing intent to parent.
"Gestational Mother" replaces the notion of surrogate mother.
"Surrogate" is politically charged would that often has negative
connotations attached to it. The definition of "adoptive co-parent" was
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included to accommodate a non-biological adult, of either gender, who
intends to co-parent the child conceived in part by the biological parent.
§ 2 ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: MATERNAL RIGHTS OF THE DONEE
Unless modified by sections 4 and 5, a woman who gives birth to
a child is the child's legal mother.
COMMENT
The purpose of this section is to establish maternity as envisioned by
the technologies discussed here. This provision can be amended or
modified should there be a growth in the use of technology enabling a
woman to give birth to a child not genetically related.
§ 3 ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PATERNITY RIGHTS OF THE DONOR
(1) Married Woman:
(a) Absent any written agreement to the contrary, if a woman
is married and her husband consents to the insemination, he
is the presumed natural father of the child thereby created.
(b) A donor may assert his intent to paternal rights if-
(1) A written agreement is signed by all parties at least
thirty days prior to the insemination.
(2) An uninvolved person witness the agreement.
(3) The agreement must be registered with the State
Department of Health, or similar regulatory body,
where it will remain as evidence of the agreement.
(2) Unmarried Woman:
(a) Absent any written agreement to the contrary, a donor of
semen for use in the artificial insemination of a woman
other than his wife, is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father.
(b) A donor may assert his intent for paternal rights if:
(1) A written agreement is signed by all parties at least
thirty days prior to the insemination.
(2) An uninvolved person witness the agreement.
(3) The agreement must be registered with the State
Department of Health, or similar regulatory body,
where it will remain as evidence of the agreement.
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COMMENT
The primary purpose of this section is to define the rights and
responsibilities of a donor. It recognizes and honors contractual
agreements made between the parties regarding paternity. The language
of this section provides the best statutory protection for all possible
parties. The child is protected in two ways. One, if the woman is
married and her husband consents to the procedure, he is the presumed
legal father of the child. Second, a donor can contract at the outset for
paternity rights.
All women are equally protected because the statute does not
require the involvement of a physician. Unmarried women receive
statutory protection from donors asserting paternal rights because the
donor's rights are automatically terminated unless a written and
registered agreement is made at least thirty days prior to the
insemination. Finally, gay men will be able to assert paternity rights in
surrogate contracts by signing a written and registered agreement.
§ 4 Surrogacy Agreement
(1) The gestational mother, her husband if she is married, and the
intended parent(s) may enter into a written agreement
whereby the surrogate relinquishes all her rights and duties as
a parent of a child to be conceived through assisted
reproduction, and the intended parents may become the
parents of the child pursuant to the following:
(a) The gestational mother is at least eighteen years old and
has borne at least one child.
(b) The intended parent(s) and the gestational mother are
represented by separate counsel. The intended parent(s)
may pay for the gestational mother's legal expenses.
(c) The intended parent(s) and the gestational mother submit
to psychological testing prior to entering into the
contract. The practitioner must submit to the State
Board of Health, his or her determination of a party's
psychological fitness for fulfilling a surrogacy contract.
Both parties must be deemed psychologically fit prior to
entering into the written agreement.
(d) Compensation to the gestational mother should not
exceed $15,000.
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(e) The surrogacy arrangement must be accomplished
through the State Board of Health or similar regulatory
body, who will review and qualify the parties based on
compliance with sections 4(1)(a)-(d). A written
agreement, signed by all parties plus a witness, must be
submitted to the agency. The agreement wvill provide
evidence of the parties' intent to enter into a surrogacy
agreement. Once filed, the agreement will be deemed a
binding legal contract. As a contract, both parties dll
have the right to specific performance.
(f) Prior to pregnancy, either the gestational mother or the
intended parent(s) may terminate the contract by filing a
written notice with the State Board of Health. The
notice will be honored as evidence of the party's intent
to terminate the contract.
(g) The gestational mother has full constitutional rights to
terminate her pregnancy at anytime. If an abortion is
medically indicated (for her or the fetus's health) the
gestational mother will be compensated pro rata, per the
original agreement, for the amount of time she was
pregnant. If the decision is unilateral, the gestational
mother forfeits all claims to compensation.
(2) Paternity is to be determined pursuant to section 3.
(3) Co-parenting may be modified pursuant to section 5.
COMMENT
The purpose of this section is to define the procedures as well as the
rights and responsibilities of all the parties involved in a surrogacy
arrangement. The language of the statute honors the right to contract
by informed adults while reflecting an appreciation for the concerns
raised regarding the appropriateness of a woman agreeing to bear a
child on behalf of another. We believe that fully informed adults would
not enter into surrogacy agreements unless both believe that they will
derive some benefit.310  The requirements of sections 1(b) and (c)
ensure that all parties are truly informed prior to entering into the
3M°See Kerian, supra note 45, at 150, citing RICHARD POSNER, TiE ECON- t [ c A!N LysiS
OF LAw 3 (1996); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics of Economics of Enurcu. (o,! rt ts of
Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. Co, mip. HEALTiH L. & POL'y 21 (1939).
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agreement. Requiring both parties to undergo and pass a psychological
test, provides the best assurance that both parties are mentally and
emotionally able to fulfill the terms of the contract. Requiring separate
legal counsel ensures that both parties are fully apprised of the terms of
the contract.
Subsection (e) describes the procedural requirements. Subsection
(f) and (g) describe the situations in which the agreement may be
terminated. Subsection (g) recognizes the gestational mother's
constitutional rights to an abortion. However, we also honor the basic
tenants of contract law. Therefore, if the gestational mother chooses to
exercise her constitutional right and terminate the pregnancy, we feel
that she is untitled to any compensation that might have been
contracted for.
5 Adoption by Adoptive Co-Parent31'
(1) A non-biological co-parent may claim parental pursuant to
subsections (a) and/or (b):
(a) An adult person, unrelated to the biological parent, may,
with the biological parent's written permission, legally
adopt the child created through assisted reproduction.
The non-biological co-parent then has full parental rights
responsibilities and claims including, but not limited to
custodial or visitation claims. The written agreement
must be submitted to regulatory agency mentioned in
§§ 3,4 and5.
(b) A non-biological co-parent, if he or she has not legally
adopted pursuant to §5(1)(a), may petition the court for a
determination of parental rights in suit for custody or
visitation if:
(1) he or she can prove that they functioned as a co-
parent since the child(ren)'s birth.
(2) he or she can demonstrate that it is in the best
interest of the child(ren).
311Section 5 is modeled in part, after an argument made by Vickie L. Henry, A Tale of
Three Women: A Survey of the Rights and Responsibilities of Unmarried Women who Conceive
by Alternative Insemination and a Model for Legislation, 19 Aht. J.L. & MED. 285, 309-10
(1993).
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COMMENT
The purpose of this section is to acknowledge and determine the
parental rights of a non-biological co-parent. The language of the
statue accommodates co-parents regardless of gender or sexual
orientation. This section protects the interests of the non-biological co-
parent as well as the child in the event that the biological mother dies or
attempts to end contact between the child and the non-biological
parent.3
12
CONCLUSION
An increasing number of gays and lesbians want to bear and raise
genetically related children. In accessing assisted reproductive
technologies, gays and lesbians face barriers that are often unique to
them based solely on their sexual orientation. These include moral
ethical, financial and legal barriers. With the advent of such a "gay-by
boom," courts will be forced to address these issues. In order to
provide equal access to reproductive technologies, courts must become
willing to more liberally apply or expand current statutory and case
law.
A comprehensive and uniform legislative reform offers gays and
lesbians the opportunity to equalize access to assisted reproductive
technologies. Given the increasing numbers and the changing
demographics of those accessing the technology, it is not too far
removed for states to consider statutes similar to the one proposed.
Because the number of people being discriminated against might be
very high and underreported, successful lobbying efforts need to be
instituted by activist groups who are interested in seeking changes. 313
312See id. at 3 10.313Holly Harlow suggests that major gay and lesbian rights groups vould not bu- vdling
to lobby because they do not want to draw attention to the issue and n!,% all out ba.its talnlt
gays and lesbians. See Harlow, supra note 9. at 210-11 (citing tintm on bt1Aaid in an
interview with Kate Kendall, Executive Director of the National Lesbian Rwthts (Aranizatton
(Oct. 16, 1995)).
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